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TEACHING CRIMINAL LAW: CURING THE DISCONNECT 
NEIL P. COHEN* 
Teaching Criminal Law1 is like teaching religion: there are so many 
varieties of it, each strongly endorsed by at least one person to whom it makes 
at least some internal sense.  The result is a lack of agreement about what the 
course is all about and few external standards to assess whether the course is 
accomplishing its goals.  The problem is sorting out the core of the course.  
This involves answering the question, “What should be taught in the ordinary 
first-year Criminal Law course?”  The issue is complex and subject to widely 
different answers.  Of course the answer often depends on the personal values 
of the person answering the question.  But it is often forgotten that the answer 
should also depend on the conceptual framework for legal education at the law 
school.  Criminal Law should be seen as both a unique and important subject 
as well as part of a larger integrated curriculum with articulated goals and 
complementary components. 
To some, Criminal Law should place far more emphasis on race,2 gender,3 
domestic violence,4 justice, legal history, poverty, philosophy, legal ethics,5 
 
* Distinguished Service Professor of Law, the University of Tennessee College of Law. 
 1. I am referring to the substantive Criminal Law course that carries three or four hours of 
academic credit and is usually part of the first-year law curriculum. 
 2. See, e.g., Jodie-Marie Masley, Testimony of Chrystal Blossom James, 12 BERKELEY LA 
RAZA L.J. 433 (2001) (suggesting that a criminal law professor should have explored the race 
implications of a class hypothetical). 
 3. See, e.g., Kristin Bebelaar et al., Domestic Violence in Legal Education and Legal 
Practice: A Dialogue Between Professors and Practitioners, 11 J.L. & POL’Y 409 (2003).  The 
article notes that an obvious place for this discussion is with the battered woman’s defense.  Other 
illustrative areas for gender-based analysis include the concept of reasonableness, omissions 
where parents are charged with child neglect, and provocation.  See also Catharine A. 
MacKinnon, Mainstreaming Feminism in Legal Education, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 199, 207-08 
(2003) (recommending the coverage of feminist issues throughout the curriculum, even in the 
basic Criminal Law course, including issues exploring whether women should be subject to the 
death penalty when they have not been fully represented in the formulation of death penalty laws 
and procedures). 
  An interesting variation of this approach occurred in a seminar where upper-class law 
students enrolled in a course entitled “A Feminist Revisit to the First-Year Curriculum.”  The 
course examined the feminist issues that were presented by subjects covered in the various first-
year offerings.  Anita Bernstein, A Feminist Revisit to the First-Year Curriculum, 46 J. LEGAL 
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and a host of other relevant considerations, sometimes broadly characterized as 
the social context of the law.6  Some even argue that there should be 
substantial coverage of a particular crime, such as prostitution,7 that reflects 
particular issues. 
Others think that law classes should deal more with the skills that lawyers 
need to practice law.  This could include such skills as mediation, negotiation, 
fact investigation, “thinking like a lawyer,” interviewing, and trial practice.  It 
has also been suggested that law school classes should focus more on the client 
and the client’s perspective.8  Yet other faculty members believe that law 
school should be “above trade” and view the inadequacy of skills training as a 
virtue.9 
Resolving these sometimes conflicting course objectives might be 
impossible in the time-crunched first-year Criminal Law course.  Everyone 
would agree that not all of the above topics could be covered, even poorly, in a 
three hour Criminal Law offering that also deals with the more traditional 
facets of the subject.  This means that the criminal law instructor must make 
some hard choices that could engender serious challenge by people with 
different values and priorities. 
The matter is made more complex because the instructor’s choices are 
solidly protected by the important doctrine of academic freedom.  Whatever 
path the professor takes—such as including or not including much attention to 
race, gender, poverty, sociology, history or philosophy, or any number of 
skills—will likely be respected by a faculty and administration uninterested in 
interfering with an instructor’s decisions about his or her course coverage and 
focus. 
In addition, the query about the content of the Criminal Law course raises 
broad questions that a faculty does not address in any systematic way or even 
give its members much guidance in resolving.  Courses are viewed as the 
province of the instructor rather than as a constituent element of a larger 
conceptual entity.  For inexplicable reasons, legal education is viewed as a 
 
EDUC. 217 (1996).  In revisiting Criminal Law, the students discussed the gender issues raised by 
the sentencing of Leona Helmsley.  Id. at 221-22. 
 4. See, e.g., Bebelaar, supra note 3, at 419 (“There has always been an obvious relationship 
between intimate and family violence and criminal law, so it should be inevitable that these topics 
pervade that course.”). 
 5. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Missing Questions: Feminist Perspectives on Legal 
Education, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1547, 1561 (1993) [hereinafter Rhode, Missing Questions]; 
Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics by the Pervasive Method, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 31 (1992). 
 6. See Rhode, Missing Questions, supra note 5, at 1558. 
 7. See, e.g., Beverly Balos, Teaching Prostitution Seriously, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 709 
(2001). 
 8. See Ann Shalleck, Constructions of the Client Within Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REV. 
1731, 1731-33 (1993). 
 9. See Rhode, Missing Questions, supra note 5, at 1555. 
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series of component parts that eventually comprise a whole.  To some, the end 
result, irrespective of how it got that way, is a spectacular educational 
experience.  To others, of course, the whole is less than the sum of the parts. 
The result of these conflicting views of course content, the faculty’s 
unwillingness to conceptualize legal education as an integrated whole, and the 
individual faculty member’s independence engendered by the concept of 
academic freedom, is that each faculty member is rather free to structure the 
basic Criminal Law course with little direction from the administration or 
colleagues. 
Many of us who teach Criminal Law resolve the issue by trying to cut the 
baby in half.  In our first-year Criminal Law course, we deal with many of 
these issues, though none well or in any depth.  Lip service replaces serious 
analysis.  We might say we “cover” race and gender and skill issues, but in 
truth we give our students grossly inadequate background materials that almost 
trivialize very important matters affected by the criminal law.  According to 
one observer: 
Nor do conventional approaches adequately situate formal doctrine in social or 
historical context.  The level of abstraction in most classrooms is both too 
theoretical and not theoretical enough; it neither probes the underlying 
foundations of legal doctrine nor offers practical assistance about how to use 
that doctrine in particular cases.10 
I.  A PERSONAL SHORT STORY 
I have taught the first-year Criminal Law course for many years.  I 
occasionally served as a criminal defense lawyer during that time.  The 
Criminal Law course I taught dealt with the traditional subjects, including such 
esoterica as impossible attempts and criminalization—what should be made 
criminal.  Because of time constraints, the course often omitted coverage of 
crimes that people who actually handle criminal cases must understand, such 
as theft, assault, robbery, and burglary.  It also omitted any in-depth coverage 
of sometimes dispositive issues like burden of proof, fact and statutory 
interpretation, and the persuasive background of the guilty plea. 
A few years ago, I was afforded the chance to leave teaching for a short 
period and become an assistant district attorney11 prosecuting state cases in a 
 
 10. Id. at 1558. 
 11. The opportunity itself is worth noting and merits serious consideration by many 
academics.  At the suggestion of a member of the local district attorney general’s office, I 
arranged to swap jobs with an experienced district attorney general.  For one semester, he moved 
into my law school office and taught full-time.  I moved into his office and handled criminal 
cases.  All administrative matters were unchanged.  Each of us continued to be paid by our 
original employers.  Thus, there was no problem with such matters as retirement and insurance.  
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medium-sized county.  I did so full-time for five months and then part-time for 
several more years.  The experience was phenomenal.  I learned so much about 
the workings of the criminal justice system, including plea bargains, discovery, 
and the grand jury. 
Both during and after this experience, I reflected a lot about the basic 
Criminal Law course that I had taught many times.  During my relatively brief 
tenure as a prosecutor, I came to realize that many important issues routinely 
faced by lawyers in criminal law are simply ignored or given short shrift in the 
basic Criminal Law course and are not systematically taught in any other 
offering.  For example, I did not encounter any impossible attempt cases, but I 
did see a significant number of assault-related incidents.  And every single day 
I spent a significant amount of time reading statutes and case files, and trying 
to assess how, or whether, the facts I thought I could prove would enable me to 
establish the elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 
II.  CORE ISSUES IN CRIMINAL LAW COURSE 
It seems to me that a basic Criminal Law course should encompass at least 
three general goals.  Currently, American Criminal Law courses routinely 
cover some of these matters and virtually ignore others. 
A. Universal Constructs 
First, the basic American Criminal Law course should educate law students 
about a number of universal theoretical constructs that are the basis for 
criminal law.  These include such concepts as responsibility (and defenses), 
intentionality, mens rea, actus reus, causation, punishment, harm, and inchoate 
offenses. 
B. Structure of the Criminal Law and the Criminal Justice System 
Second, and often overlapping with the first goal, it should teach the 
general structure of American substantive criminal law.  This embraces such 
traditional topics as burden of proof, vagueness, accomplice liability, 
codification,12 and the basic structure of a modern criminal code, such as the 
 
The only administrative matter concerned, of course, parking.  We exchanged parking spaces, but 
had to make a financial adjustment because one of our parking spaces cost more than the other. 
 12. The treatment of statutes in existing Criminal Law course materials is interesting in its 
variety.  Every casebook discusses the rise of statutes in criminal law.  The materials are 
presented ordinarily in the context of the principle of legality and vagueness.  Professor Dressler, 
for example, has written a well-regarded criminal law course book that devotes a whole chapter to 
the “Modern Role of Criminal Statutes.”  JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
CRIMINAL LAW 85-120 (3d ed. 2003).  The chapter includes five substantial cases and some 
notes.  The cases focus on the principle of legality, the values of statutory clarity, and statutory 
interpretation, but do not require students to read and interpret statutes without the judicial sifting 
that occurs in the given appellate decisions.  The chapter also does not teach much about the 
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Model Penal Code.  It also should encompass the general structure of the 
criminal justice system, including the roles of the various actors such as the 
police, courts, prosecutors, legislators, and defense lawyers.  Additionally, 
there should be an introduction to fundamental societal issues, such as race and 
gender in the context of criminal law. 
C. Skills 
Third, the course should contribute to first-year law students’ acquisition 
of important skills,13 especially ones that lawyers need in criminal cases and 
 
interpretation of statutes other than through one case that does discuss a few approaches to 
statutory interpretation in criminal cases—especially strict construction.  There are no problems 
that require students to read and parse statutes without the benefit of an appellate bench’s 
coaching.  If this is the only training students get in statutory interpretation, their education is 
lacking in a most important way.  It should be noted, of course, that Professor Dressler does not 
deserve criticism because he has not chosen to address statutory interpretation in more than a 
perfunctory way.  His choice of materials and approach simply reflects a value structure that 
assumes students get instruction about statutes in other courses. 
  Professor LaFave, on the other hand, deals more directly with statutory interpretation, 
including processes of both judicial and administrative bodies.  He even devotes a few pages to 
some canons of statutory interpretation.  See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, MODERN CRIMINAL LAW: 
CASES, COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS 53-54 (3d ed. 2001). 
  Many other criminal law course books do no more than hint at the role of statutes in 
modern criminal law.  Often this occurs in the mandatory discussion of vagueness and the 
principle of legality.  See, e.g., RICHARD J. BONNIE ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 35-57 (1997).  This 
book contains an interesting potential statutory exercise when it discusses a statute defining 
obscenity.  Id. at 59.  See also LLOYD L. WEINREB, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, COMMENT, 
QUESTIONS 740-42 (7th ed. 2003); PHILLIP E. JOHNSON & MORGAN CLOUD, CRIMINAL LAW: 
CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT 69-73 (7th ed. 2002) (includes a brief discussion of the role of 
criminal statutes in the context of introducing the Model Penal Code). 
  Another approach is to deal rather heavily with statutes by intensively using the Model 
Penal Code’s provisions to illustrate various issues.  See RUSSELL L. WEAVER ET AL., CRIMINAL 
LAW: CASES, MATERIALS & PROBLEMS (2002) (presenting students with many provisions of the 
Model Penal Code, including some spanning several pages, which should provide first-year law 
students valuable exposure to criminal statutes and helpful experience reading and understanding 
them). 
 13. It is obvious that I find that much of the approach espoused by the MacCrate Report is 
worth very serious consideration by law schools.  See LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT—AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW 
SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP (1992).  More particularly, I agree with 
MacCrate’s observation: 
I suggest that [the MacRate Report] challenges all law teachers, whatever their scholarly 
interests or pedagogical bent, to look beyond their own compartments of scholarship and 
teaching, to escape the confines separating doctrinal learning from skills and values 
instruction, and to identify the role they choose to play in the preparation of lawyers along 
the educational continuum of that profession of which all who work in the law are 
members. 
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that are well-suited for inclusion in the basic Criminal Law course.  Obviously 
students must acquire solid legal-reasoning skills.  Often this is taught through 
the case method where case after case is parsed in a Socratic style dialogue.14  
Another skill the case method teaches is case analysis—the ability to read, 
understand, critique, and manipulate, mostly appellate, judicial decisions.  The 
problem is that the same case analysis skills are surely covered in many other 
first-year courses, such as Contracts, Torts, and often Constitutional Law.  
Students learn how to read, analyze, and apply judicial decisions in these 
courses.  It is reasonable to suggest that the other first-year courses might 
provide sufficient, if not too much, attention to this skill, releasing Criminal 
Law from the rather substantial burden of teaching case analysis and freeing it 
to focus on skills not necessarily covered elsewhere in the first-year 
curriculum. 
Another skill—the ability to understand and apply statutes—however, 
frequently is given short shrift in the first-year Criminal Law course despite its 
paramount importance to modern law in general15 and criminal law in 
particular.  Indeed, there may well be law students who finish their first year of 
law school without having been presented with many statutes.  More tragically, 
many law students complete their legal education without much organized 
instruction in dealing with statutes, despite the predominant role of this form of 
law.  This unfortunate lacuna is of significant concern for the student who will 
handle criminal cases.  The modern truth is that criminal law today is statutory 
law.  Anyone who practices criminal law must be able to read, understand, and 
apply statutes, some of which are complex and poorly written.16  This fact 
 
Robert MacCrate, Preparing Lawyers to Participate Effectively in the Legal Profession, 44 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 89, 89 (1994). 
 14. A former colleague, who was a strong critic of the so-called Socratic method of legal 
education, once observed that if Socrates actually saw the teaching technique that bears his name 
he would voluntarily take hemlock. 
 15. For an articulate argument about the role of statutes in modern law and the many 
advantages of teaching law students about statutes, see Jack Stark, Teaching Statutory Law, 44 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 579 (1994).  See also H. Miles Foy, III, Legislation and Pedagogy in Contracts 
101, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1273, 1274 (2000) (“[T]he established forms [of teaching contract law] 
do not deal adequately with legislation, the most important legal phenomenon of the modern 
era.”). 
  Teaching about statutes, whether or not in the Criminal Law class, should assist students 
in understanding both the process by which statutes are written by legislatures and interpreted by 
courts, as well as the structure of statutes—especially lengthy complicated ones.  One useful 
instructional tool is to have students actually write or rewrite all or part of a statute, and then have 
the students’ efforts critiqued by other students, perhaps serving as advocates for opposite sides 
or as judges faced with applying the students’ work.  This exercise provides students with terrific 
insight into statutes and the legislative process. 
 16. A similar argument has been made with regard to Contracts.  See Foy, supra note 15, at 
1274 (recommending that the first-year Contracts course devote more attention to statutes and 
their interpretation). 
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alone justifies using the Criminal Law course to teach statutory analysis to 
first-year students.17 
Another important skill, often given short shrift in the first-year law 
curriculum, is the ability to assess, marshal, and “manipulate” facts.  In the 
context of criminal cases, it includes understanding how critical facts are in 
criminal cases and how ambiguous they may well be.  It also includes a basic 
understanding of the processes used in criminal cases to present facts and to 
resolve the facts to be applied to the law. 
Finally, criminal law students need to understand how the facts and law 
interact in an adversary context in criminal cases.  This requires students to 
understand the applicable law, including its many ambiguities, and how facts 
are used to support the position of the government or the defendant.  They also 
should begin the process of learning how to marshal the facts as an adversary 
would. 
III.  A REPORT CARD 
The basic Criminal Law course and the materials used to teach the course 
are somewhat well-equipped to satisfy the first goal, teaching students the 
fundamental theoretical constructs that shape American criminal law.  The 
course is less successful in teaching the basic structure of the criminal law.  
Unfortunately, the criminal law is viewed piecemeal with little opportunity for 
students to reflect on the whole.  Thus, each defense is studied, but too often 
the concept of defenses is given short shrift and virtually no effort is made to 
compare defenses.  Moreover, the overall structure of a criminal code is 
ignored, as the focus is on individual components but not on the 
interrelationship of the various pieces. 
One of the biggest weaknesses, however, is in the area of skills.  Many of 
us do not see the Criminal Law class as the proper place to teach skills.  
Rather, we focus on theory, leaving to others, such as Criminal Procedure and 
trial practice courses, the daunting task of teaching skills.  This decision, to 
some extent prompted by enormous time pressures in a three-hour course, 
might well shortchange the student’s legal education. 
IV.  A MODEST SUGGESTION 
I suggest that law faculty who teach in the criminal law area reconsider 
what they teach in this basic course.  More particularly, they should assess 
what skills they try to teach.  Of course, any effort to increase the skills being 
taught in the Criminal Law course may well be hampered by the paucity of 
 
 17. Another approach is a freestanding course on legislation as an addition to an individual 
course’s attention to statutes when appropriate, such as tax or criminal law.  See generally Stark, 
supra note 15. 
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available materials that facilitate skills teaching.18  What is needed is a new set 
of materials that specifically addresses statutes and facts in the adversarial 
context in which criminal law operates. 
A wonderful vehicle would be the use of problems that require the students 
to understand criminal statutes and apply them as an adversary to a set of facts.  
This approach, already championed by others,19 would force students to deal 
directly with statutes as a primary source of law.  To apply the statutes, the 
student would have to read them carefully and understand what is in the statute 
and what is omitted or possibly covered in an ambiguous manner.  In applying 
the statute to a set of facts, the student would have to figure out what are the 
elements of the statute and how the facts might or might not assist in the proof 
of those elements.  Unlike the case method, where an appellate court identifies 
the relevant portions of the statute, the student would have to make this 
determination without the benefit of the thoughts of an appellate judge. 
It should be stressed that giving more attention to skills does not 
necessarily mean that other issues must be given short shrift.  Skills training 
can be combined with other important issues.  For example, assume that a 
criminal law professor wants to include statutory analysis, fact assessment and 
argumentation, and considerations of race and gender in a portion of a 
Criminal Law course.  Perhaps the instructor would use a problem with a fact 
situation and a statute that contained a mental element using an objective 
reasonableness standard.  The students could carefully parse the statute, then 
apply the facts to the statute, perhaps in an adversarial role-playing situation.  
During the process students could discuss how the concept of reasonableness 
might be based on assumptions that involve racial or gender stereotypes but 
give too little attention to differences in perceptions based on race or gender.  
This could lead to a discussion of the role of certain fundamental values in 
criminal law. 
The bottom line is that those of us who teach the basic Criminal Law 
course should give some time to reconsidering two issues.  First, how does 
what we do relate to the other parts of the law curriculum, especially the first-
year offerings?  Do we complement the other courses so that our students end 
the year or their three years with the skills and knowledge we want them to 
have?  Second, how does our course relate to the skills needed by someone 
 
 18. See, e.g., Bebelaar, supra note 3, at 424 (noting that a survey of criminal law teachers 
concluded that certain subjects were not taught in the course because the teaching materials did 
not include the topic). 
 19. For a powerful argument in favor of the problem method, see Myron Moskovitz, Beyond 
the Case Method: It’s Time to Teach with Problems, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 241 (1992).  Professor 
Moskovitz has authored a criminal law course book that uses many creative problems (plus cases 
and commentary, of course) in the basic Criminal Law course.  See MYRON MOSKOVITZ, CASES 
AND PROBLEMS IN CRIMINAL LAW (5th ed. 2003). 
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involved in criminal cases?  The answers might suggest that perhaps new 
approaches merit serious consideration. 
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